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Lessons learnt from easing COVID-19 restrictions: an analysis 
of countries and regions in Asia Pacific and Europe
Emeline Han*, Melisa Mei Jin Tan*, Eva Turk, Devi Sridhar, Gabriel M Leung, Kenji Shibuya, Nima Asgari, Juhwan Oh, Alberto L García-Basteiro, 
Johanna Hanefeld, Alex R Cook, Li Yang Hsu, Yik Ying Teo, David Heymann, Helen Clark, Martin McKee, Helena Legido-Quigley
The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented global crisis. Many countries have implemented restrictions on 
population movement to slow the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 and prevent health 
systems from becoming overwhelmed; some have instituted full or partial lockdowns. However, lockdowns and other 
extreme restrictions cannot be sustained for the long term in the hope that there will be an effective vaccine or 
treatment for COVID-19. Governments worldwide now face the common challenge of easing lockdowns and 
restrictions while balancing various health, social, and economic concerns. To facilitate cross-country learning, this 
Health Policy paper uses an adapted framework to examine the approaches taken by nine high-income countries and 
regions that have started to ease COVID-19 restrictions: five in the Asia Pacific region (ie, Hong Kong [Special 
Administrative Region], Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea) and four in Europe (ie, Germany, Norway, 
Spain, and the UK). This comparative analysis presents important lessons to be learnt from the experiences of these 
countries and regions. Although the future of the virus is unknown at present, countries should continue to share 
their experiences, shield populations who are at risk, and suppress transmission to save lives.
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented global 
crisis. By mid-September, 2020, over 22 million confirmed 
cases of COVID-19 had been reported worldwide, with 
almost 930 000 deaths.1 At least 186 countries have 
implemented varying degrees of restrictions on popula-
tion movement to slow the spread of the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 and prevent health 
systems from becoming overwhelmed; these restrictions 
have amounted to lockdowns in 82 countries.2 Although 
such measures might have saved lives, they have come at 
a heavy socioeconomic cost. The World Bank’s projections 
point to the deepest global recession since World War 2, 
with millions of people falling into unemployment and 
poverty.3 Lockdowns and other extreme restrictions cannot 
be sustained for the long term in the hope that there will 
be an effective vaccine or treatment for COVID-19. Rather, 
these restrictions give time for countries to reduce the 
incidence of disease and put in place robust, yet sus-
tainable, measures to prevent and control transmission.
When and how a country should ease restrictions are 
the common challenges that governments worldwide now 
face as they seek to balance various health, social, and 
economic concerns. WHO has warned that a premature 
lifting of lockdowns could spark a resurgence of infections 
and cause even more severe, longer-term damage to the 
economy than exists as a result of lockdowns.4 Rawaf and 
colleagues5 have outlined four public health principles 
that should be considered in each country’s exit strategy: 
infection status, community acceptance, public health 
capacity, and health-system capacity. Adapting and 
building on these prin ciples, we developed a framework 
with add itional components and subcomponents (panel). 
Using this comparative framework, we examined the 
measures taken in nine high-income countries and 
regions that have started to ease restrictions that were 
imposed in response to COVID-19, which were selected to 
provide a range of epidemiological experiences and policy 
responses. Five countries or regions were in the Asia 
Pacific region (ie, Hong Kong [Special Administrative 
Region], Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and South 
Korea) and four were in Europe (ie, Germany, Norway, 
Spain, and the UK). In Asia Pacific, they include countries 
and regions with and without experience of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) or Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS). In Europe they include countries that, 
in the initial wave of COVID-19, were (ie, Spain and 
the UK) or were not (ie, Germany and Norway) severely 
affected. In reviewing international experiences, we have 
been concerned about an apparent absence of clear and 
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consistent strategies for exiting restrictions. We have 
identified five prerequisites for easing COVID-19 lock-
downs and restrictions: knowledge of infection status, 
community engagement, adequate public health capacity, 
adequate health-system capacity, and border controls. We 
describe how each of these nine countries and territories 
have addressed these issues. Although it might not be 
possible or beneficial to replicate the exact same mea-
sures in different countries due to varying socioeconomic 
contexts, countries can consider policy alternatives and 
novel solutions developed by other countries and calibrate 
them according to their domestic circumstances and 
resources.
Overall approaches
The timing of the imposition and easing of restrictions 
in each country has varied (figure 1), as have national 
responses (table). Countries will, ideally, base decisions 
regarding easing restrictions on some combination of the 
epidemiology of infections and the social and economic 
consequences of restrictions. Whichever combination is 
chosen, governments should be explicit about their goals 
and transparent in their decision making, and the 
measures taken should be parts of a clear overall strategy; 
however, this is not always the case.
Several countries have produced dashboards of indi-
cators of the factors being considered, such as Japan, 
which considers the infection situation, the medical-
service system, and the surveillance system.6 Spain has 
published a panel of indicators, including epidemi-
ological, mobility, social, and economic parameters,7 
although without any explicit weighting in the decision-
making process.
There are two broad approaches to decision making. In 
Singapore, Norway, Spain, and (now for local outbreaks) 
the UK, politicians, drawing on expert advice, decide 
when and which restrictions to relax but without explicit 
and public criteria. In some cases, the activities to be 
permitted are set out in advance, as in the Singapore 
Government’s three phases of reopening, moving 
progressively from lower to higher risk activities.8 
However, the basis on which risk is estimated is often 
unclear, with little evidence that the growing under-
standing of aerosol-related transmission has been 
considered. The four nations of the UK aligned in their 
strategy until mid-March, when each nation (England, 
Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland) diverged in their 
specific approaches and exit from lockdown.
Japan, Germany, South Korea, and, in some cases, 
the UK are lifting or reimposing restrictions on the basis 
of epidemiological thresholds. For example, Germany’s 
Federal Government has placed local authorities in 
charge of lifting lockdowns in individual states, subject 
to a so-called emergency brake mechanism that requires 
any region to consider reimposing a lockdown, if there 
are more than 50 new daily cases per 100 000 residents 
for 7 consecutive days. This mechanism has already 
been triggered in a few districts that had spikes in the 
number of new cases, many of which were linked to 
outbreaks in meatpacking plants.9 Hong Kong adopted 
a similar supress and lift strategy since the start of 
the outbreak, under which restrictions are tightened 
and relaxed in accordance with the epide miological 
situation.10 However, this approach risks reimposing 
restrictions for an entire region even when the outbreak 
is limited to a single factory or small community. 
The importance of continued surveillance is clear from 
New Zealand, with its four-level alert system. Having 
progressed from a full nationwide lockdown at level 
four in late March, 2020, to minimal restrictions at 
level one in early June, 2020, New Zealand has now 
had to revert to level two nationwide and level three 
in Auckland.11 Although Singapore, South Korea, and 
the UK also have alert-level systems, the link to particular 
countermeasures has not been equally explicit, and it is 
not clear that the UK’s system is being used.
Knowledge of infection status
It seems intuitive that a country should not open up until 
it has a surveillance system of high quality in place and 
has confirmed that infections are being suppressed. 
Unfortunately, as shown in several countries, this 
principle has often been disregarded.
This principle involves more than producing a national 
picture; real-time data of high quality are essential to 
calculate the reproduction number (R) and to ascertain 
where the disease continues to spread, thereby enabling 
targeted responses. Authorities in Hong Kong, Japan, 
Germany, Norway, Spain, and the UK have been 
reporting estimates of R, which should be safely less than 
1 to allow relaxation of restrictions. Since February, 2020, 
Hong Kong has been estimating its real-time R, the 
actual transmission rate of the virus, and minimising 
inaccuracies arising from time lags.12 Countries and Figure 1: Timeline for imposing and easing of restrictions
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regions have varied in their ability to implement effective 
find, test, trace, isolate, and support systems. Some 
locations in Asia, such as South Korea and Hong Kong, 
had systems that functioned well at the beginning of the 
pandemic, and other countries, such as Germany, were 
able to redeploy resources, whereas some countries, such 
as the UK and Spain, have struggled.
Community engagement
For societies to reopen safely, communities should be 
fully engaged and empowered to protect themselves 
from the virus and the effect of the crisis, especially 
the most vulnerable populations (figure 2). Ideally, 
authorities should ensure that they fully understand the 
reality of the situation faced by the people affected by 
their decisions, drawing on principles of coproduction of 
policy. Advice should also be consistent and credible.
Messaging around what is considered a safe physical 
distance between people has been confusing and incon-
sistent, seemingly drawing on a range of biological and 
other considerations, such as whether a large distance 
would preclude reopening of some facilities. Thus, a 1 m 
distance is recommended in Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Norway; 1·5 m in Germany and Spain; and 2 m in Japan, 
South Korea, and, until late June, 2020, England. In 
England, the recommended distance is now at least 1 m, 
whereas 2 m distance is still recommended in other 
parts of the UK.13 In New Zealand, 2 m distance between 
people is recommended in public spaces and 1 m is 
recommended in schools and workplaces at high alert 
levels, but there are no distancing requirements at 
level one. New Zealand also pioneered a social bubble 
model that allows a defined group of people to have 
close physical contact with each other while practising 
physical distancing rules with others outside that group.11 
According to this approach, what started off as house-
hold bubbles under lockdown were slowly allowed to 
extend to small and exclusive groups of family and 
friends, and then further allowed to expand and merge 
with other bubbles. The UK nations have endorsed this 
idea and started a similar support bubble arrangement 
since June, 2020.14
Overall 
strategy
Knowledge of 
infection status
Community engagement Public-health capacity Health-system capacity Measures for border control
Asia Pacific
Hong Kong Suppress and 
lift strategy
Real-time R 
estimated and 
reported since 
February, 2020
1 m physical distancing and mask 
wearing practised; despite serious 
mistrust in government, 
community has shown a high 
rate of adherence and built their 
own collective response to the 
pandemic
Daily PCR-testing capacity being 
increased from 4500 to >10 000; 
police supercomputer system used 
for contact tracing and electronic 
wristbands paired with mobile 
phone apps used to monitor 
people under quarantine
Second-tier isolation beds and 
community isolation facilities 
added to public hospitals; safety 
measures have been effective in 
protecting health-care workers 
from infection
Border closed to visitors; 
all arrivals must submit a 
health declaration form 
online, have temperature 
screening and testing on 
arrival, and serve a 14-day 
quarantine
Japan Trigger-based 
approach
One indicator is an 
incidence rate of 
≤0·5 cumulative 
infections per 
100 000 people in 
the past week
2 m physical distancing and mask 
wearing practised; citizens are 
encouraged to avoid so-called 
3Cs (ie, closed spaces, crowded 
places, and close contact); 
adherence aided by existing 
social etiquette
Daily PCR-testing capacity is low 
but is being increased from 
6000 tests per day in May to more 
than 22 000 tests per day; manual 
tracing done and new mobile 
phone app introduced in 
June, 2020
Initially, all patients were 
admitted but, due to low 
capacity, hospitals now focus 
on caring for people who are 
vulnerable or have moderate or 
severe disease; people with mild 
disease and people who are 
asymptomatic supported at 
home or at lodging facilities
All arrivals are subject to 
14-day quarantine, and 
travellers from selected 
countries are denied entry or, 
if allowed for exceptional 
reasons, subject to testing
New Zealand Four-level 
alert system
No publicly specified 
indicator
So-called social bubble approach 
allowed gradual expansion of 
small and exclusive social groups; 
no physical distancing required at 
alert level one
Testing capacity being increased; 
manual and app-based tracing 
being done
Efforts being made to increase 
number of ICU beds and 
number of staff trained to use 
ICU equipment
Border closed to most visitors; 
all arrivals are tested and 
quarantined for 14 days
Singapore Three-phase 
plan
No publicly specified 
indicator
1 m physical distancing and face 
covering required; government 
messages have consistently 
emphasised individual 
responsibility, although policy 
changes have generated some 
initial public confusion
More than 13 000 PCR tests per 
day done in June, 2020, with plans 
to increase to 40 000 tests per day; 
manual and app-based tracing 
done
ICUs are well under capacity; to 
reduce pressure on public 
hospitals, patients with mild 
symptoms are transferred to 
private hospitals or community 
facilities for monitoring
Border closed to most visitors; 
all arrivals must submit a 
health declaration form, serve 
a 14-day Stay Home Notice, 
and be tested
South Korea Trigger-based 
approach, 
three-level 
physical 
distancing 
scheme
Level one applies if 
number of daily new 
cases is <50, 
level two for 
50–100 cases, and 
level three for 
>100 cases
2 m physical distancing and mask 
wearing practised; government 
has used transparent 
communication methods to 
secure public cooperation, 
including detailed reporting of 
new cases via websites, mobile 
phone apps, and text alerts
Mass testing at a rate of 
20 000 PCR tests per day, including 
at drive-through and walk-through 
stations; records from medical 
facilities, global positioning 
system, credit card transaction 
history, and closed-circuit 
television used to supplement 
manual contact tracing
On the basis of a triage system, 
people with mild disease or who 
are asymptomatic are 
monitored at residential 
treatment centres; people with 
moderate or severe disease are 
cared for at government-
designated hospitals
All arrivals must submit a 
health declaration form, 
install a mobile phone app, 
have temperature screening, 
testing, and 14-day 
quarantine
(Table continues on next page)
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An absence of international consensus is especially 
apparent with respect to face coverings. This difference 
reflects a combination of cultural norms and evolving 
evidence for the effectiveness of face coverings, although 
not helped by scientific inertia in some countries and in 
WHO. In Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea, the habit 
of mask wearing by people with respiratory conditions 
was already widespread before the pandemic (ie, mainly 
to protect others from seasonal viruses or as a reaction to 
air pollution). Other countries have been slower to adopt 
this practice. After months of counselling the public 
against wearing face coverings unless they were unwell, 
Singapore’s Government made it mandatory for everyone 
to wear one outside from April, 2020, and provided 
reusable cloth masks to the entire population.15 During 
the past 5 months, Germany and Spain have made it 
compulsory to wear a face covering where physical 
distancing is not possible, such as on public transport or 
in shops. In the UK, face coverings are required in 
many indoor settings, such as in community centres.16 
Norway has recommended face coverings for adults and 
young people travelling by public transport where safe 
distancing is difficult. New Zealand has not recom-
mended face coverings for the general public. Mixed 
messages and policy U-turns regarding face coverings 
have unfor tunately generated public confusion and 
challenges to adherence in many countries and regions.
Various precautionary measures have been suggested 
for schools and workplaces. In all countries and regions, 
there was, at least initially, a push toward working from 
home as far as possible, while promoting com pliance 
with distancing and hygiene rules for workers who 
needed to be physically present. In Singapore and 
South Korea, workplaces must appoint a manager who is 
responsible for implementing precautionary measures 
and monitoring employees’ health. In Asian countries 
Overall 
strategy
Knowledge of 
infection status
Community engagement Public-health capacity Health-system capacity Measures for border control
(Continued from previous page)
Europe
England Three-phase 
plan
R estimated and 
reported
At least 1 m physical distancing 
required, and face covering 
required in many indoor settings; 
some controversies have 
undermined public support for the 
government
In theory, capacity exists to do 
>200 000 PCR tests per day but 
there are major logistical 
problems; centralised testing and 
tracing systems heavily criticised 
and local public health teams 
taking over some tracing; initial 
attempt to develop an app failed; 
Scotland and Northern Ireland 
have implemented their own apps
Temporary hospitals on 
standby; routine health services 
gradually resuming while 
maintaining capacity for 
patients with COVID-19
Arrivals from particular 
countries must provide their 
journey and contact details, 
and self-isolate at home for 
14 days
Germany Trigger-based 
approach
Uses R and 7-day 
incidence rate per 
100 000 inhabitants 
as indicators
1·5 m physical distancing 
required, and face covering 
required where safe distancing 
not possible; despite initial public 
support, some fatigue has set in; 
inconsistent messages and 
policies across different states 
have caused public confusion
Continuous scale up of testing 
capacity to over 150 000 PCR tests 
per day; manual tracing done and 
new mobile phone app introduced 
in June, 2020
ICUs are under capacity; initially, 
there was a scarcity of 
protective equipment
People entering or returning 
to Germany from a country 
designated as a risk area are 
required to quarantine
Norway Long-term 
timetable 
with sets of 
changes on 
specified 
dates
R estimated and 
reported
1 m physical distancing required 
and masks recommended for 
adults and young people 
travelling by public transport 
where safe distancing is difficult; 
citizens have generally complied 
with government advice and 
requirements; the call to join the 
collective effort has created a 
team spirit that is strong
Widespread testing not done; 
testing reserved for people with 
symptoms, health-care workers, 
and vulnerable populations; 
manual and app-based tracing 
done
Spare capacity varies between 
municipalities and hospitals, 
but the country has had 
sufficient health-care personnel 
to manage the local infection 
situation
Reopened borders to specified 
Nordic regions with low rates 
of transmission; arrivals from 
outside these regions are 
subject to 10-day quarantine
Spain Four-phase 
plan
No publicly specified 
indicator
1·5 m physical distancing 
required, and face covering 
required where safe distancing 
not possible
As of April, 2020, PCR-testing 
capacity reached 40 000 tests per 
day, and capacity has continued to 
increase
ICUs were over their capacities in 
many hospitals at the end of 
March and April, 2020; other 
hospital wards and spaces have 
been adapted to accommodate 
critically ill patients; health 
workforce has decreased due to 
high infection rates
Fully reopened borders to all 
countries from July 1, 2020 
(inbound travellers will not be 
quarantined)
Data have been organised according to the four public health principles developed by Rawaf and colleagues5 and modified to include additional components suggested in this Health Policy paper. Countries are 
grouped by region and organised alphabetically. A more detailed table and full data sources are available in the appendix (appendix pp 1–16). ICU=intensive care unit. R=reproduction number.
Table: Overview of approaches to easing COVID-19 restrictions in nine countries and regions as of September, 2020
See Online for appendix
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and regions, workplaces and schools also practise mask 
wearing and temperature checking. Schools have largely 
facilitated a staggered return of students, with different 
countries and regions prioritising different groups of 
students. Singapore, South Korea, and Germany started 
with graduating students attending high schools (eg, aged 
approximately 15–18 years) to minimise disruption to 
education. New Zealand, Norway, and England started 
with younger children, such as children attending primary 
schools (eg, aged approximately 5–12 years). However, it 
was not always clear whether the primary focus was the 
interests of the child or the desire to enable parents to 
return to work. Hong Kong and Spain also started with 
older students, such as students attending higher 
secondary schools (eg, aged approximately 15–18 years), as 
they are presumably better able to follow complex rules on 
physical distancing and personal hygiene than are young 
children. Japan has staggered attendance, starting with 
graduating cohorts. Countries varied considerably in the 
extent to which they used the lockdown to prepare schools 
for reopening and provided resources for online learning.
With few exceptions, such as Germany, New Zealand, 
Norway, Scotland, and South Korea, political leaders have 
struggled to secure public trust and thus support for 
continued lifestyle changes. More generally, countries 
with female leaders have done better at securing public 
confidence and adherence to new measures than have 
countries with male leaders.17 In England, con troversy sur-
rounding a trip made during lockdown by a close adviser 
to the prime minister has substantially undermined 
public confidence in the government and support for the 
measures that it was taking.18 In Hong Kong, continuing 
political unrest has substantially eroded public trust in 
the government, although the community has generally 
shown a high level of adherence that could be attributable 
to lessons learnt from the previous outbreak of SARS 
in 2003.19 Conversely, the South Korean Government has 
adopted a highly transparent communication strategy to 
gain public par ticipation by disclosing detailed infor mation 
of patients who are infected via government websites 
and text alerts, drawing on the country’s past experience 
with MERS.20 The prime minister of New Zealand and 
the director general of health have also won national and 
inter national praise for communicating firmly yet empa-
thetically, as shown in formal televised briefings and casual 
livestreaming sessions on social media.21
COVID-19 has been a reminder of the importance of 
protecting vulnerable populations and addressing health 
inequalities, especially in countries that have previously 
paid little attention to these factors. In the UK, as in some 
other countries, COVID-19 mortality has been dispro-
portionately high among residents of care homes, Black, 
Asian, and minority ethnic groups, socioeco nomically 
deprived populations, and workers on low wages.22 
These inequalities are likely to exist elsewhere, but in 
many countries, such as Germany, data are not collected. 
In Singapore, migrant workers living in overcrowded 
dormitories have constituted almost 95% of close to 
58 000 confirmed cases.23 In response, the government 
has improved disinfection regimens, established medical 
facilities onsite, and shielded workers older than 45 years 
by moving them to less dense accommodation than they 
were living in.24 All nine countries and regions have also 
heightened practices for infection prevention and control 
in care homes, including active testing and isolating of 
symptomatic residents and staff, decreasing or banning 
visitors, promoting compliance with hand hygiene, and 
supplying protective equipment to these facilities.
Economic support to mitigate the effect of the pandemic 
on communities has been provided by the governments 
of all nine countries and regions, who have announced 
substantial emergency budgets to help businesses to stay 
viable, preserve jobs, and alleviate financial burdens on 
individuals and households. In the five Asian Pacific 
countries and regions, this financial assistance has 
included one-off cash handouts to the public. Japan, with 
the highest emergency spending, amounting to 42% of its 
gross domestic product (appendix p 17),25 has handed out 
¥100 000 (approximately US$930) to every resident in 
the country. However, unclear legal grounds for paying 
leave allowance and delayed introduction of the expanded 
employment adjustment subsidy scheme have been 
heavily criticised. By contrast, the European countries 
have opted for long-term support programmes through 
strengthening their existing social safety nets. In Spain, 
the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated the approval of a 
scheme designed to provide a guaranteed minimum 
monthly income of €462 ($500) for its poorest citizens. 
Figure 2: Key measures in place to allow safe easing of restrictions
Detailed data sources are available in the appendix (appendix pp 1–16). *New Zealand adopts a so-called social 
bubble model that allows defined groups of people to have close contact with each other while maintaining safe 
distancing with other groups.
WHO recommends maintaining a 
distance of at least 1 m (as of April, 2020). 
However, this recommendation is subject 
to interpretation. Countries and regions 
have set different standards of what is 
considered a safe distance.*
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This scheme is expected to benefit 2·5 million individuals 
and cost €3 billion annually.26 The UK has also increased 
its Universal Credit and Working Tax Credit by £1040 
(approximately $1320) per year, alongside paying the 
wages of over 6 million furloughed workers until 
Oct 31, 2020.27
Public-health capacity
As already noted, at the core of any effective exit strategy 
for COVID-19 restrictions should be a surveillance 
system that includes active case finding, testing of all 
people with suspected infection, tracing their close 
contacts, isolating people with a confirmed infection, and 
supporting them in isolation. In the Asian countries and 
regions, all people with a confirmed infection are isolated 
and supported in hospitals or other facilities, whereas 
in the European countries, patients who have mild 
symptoms are typically isolated at home.28 Countries’ 
testing and tracing strategies have also varied.
At the start of the outbreak, many countries reserved 
testing for people who were symptomatic, and in Japan 
and Europe, testing generally focused on people with 
severe symptoms. However, testing criteria have evolved 
with the local and global situation and new scientific 
evidence. Norway does not recommend widespread 
testing because of the country’s low infection rate and 
high probability of false-positive results, thus limiting 
asymptomatic testing to staff and residents in nursing 
homes and close contacts of people with confirmed 
infection.29 Since August, 2020, Norway has introduced 
new rules to allow everyone who suspects that they might 
be infected to get tested without an initial assessment by 
their local community doctor.30 Meanwhile, South Korea 
mass tests indivi duals who have visited public venues or 
events where people with COVID-19 were present, and 
thus who might have come into contact with them, 
regardless of symptoms.31 Mass testing is made possible 
by having 638 screening centres and 118 public and 
private testing facilities, capable of running more than 
20 000 diagnostic tests per day.32 In Japan, testing capacity 
has not yet adequately increased, as tests are mainly done 
within the governmental public health service, where 
capacity is overstretched.33 New models such as drive-
through testing in South Korea and Germany and home-
based testing in the UK and Hong Kong have helped 
to increase access to testing while reducing crowding 
and cross-infection at hospitals. The number of daily 
COVID-19 tests that have been done per 1000 people 
varies across the nine countries and regions (appendix 
p 17),34 although considerable caution is required in 
interpreting the data because testing is based on differing 
strategies.
The rapid pace of the pandemic meant that many 
countries were poorly prepared. Early control in 
transmission in Asian countries and regions was mainly 
due to the intensive efforts of manual contact tracing by 
health workers, although many countries or regions have 
since supplemented the manual methods with digital 
methods (figure 3). South Korea uses electronic health 
records, records of credit card transactions, mobile 
phone-based global positioning system data, and closed-
circuit television to triangulate patient claims objectively 
and address limitations in memory recall in patient 
interviews.35 South Korea’s experience emphasises the 
importance of so-called shoe-leather epidemiology, by use 
of tracers who have detailed local knowledge. At first, 
the system in England was based around a system of 
centralised contact tracers following up with individuals 
through telephone calls but with little success and, in 
many areas, local public health teams have had to take on 
this role. Hong Kong uses a police supercomputer sys-
tem, normally used to investigate complex crimes, to track 
and map transmission.36 Japan, Germany, Singapore, 
New Zealand, and Norway have launched smartphone 
apps that use Bluetooth signals, global positioning system 
tracking, or recording of location-specific QR codes to 
identify and notify individuals who have come into close 
proximity with a patient with COVID-19. The UK started 
developing a similar app, but has since halted develop-
ment and decided to switch to an Apple–Google system.37 
Scotland has already launched an NHS Protect Scotland 
app on the basis of this system. After close contacts are 
identified in these nine countries, they are subject to self-
isolation and monitoring for symptoms and adherence, 
again via telephone calls or apps.
In Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and the UK, 
governments have appointed a temporary panel of 
experts in public health, epidemiology, and clinical 
medicine to provide scientific advice on handling the 
pandemic. In Japan, the association between the advice 
from the expert panel and the government’s decision was 
Figure 3: Contact-tracing tools in the nine countries and regions
Detailed data sources are available in the appendix (appendix pp 1–16).
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not clear, in particular when the state of emergency was 
declared. In the UK, the Scientific Advisory Group for 
Emergencies was criticised for the delay in announcing 
its membership and the evidence on which its advice was 
given. In response, a former chief scientific adviser to the 
government convened a group of prominent scientists 
to form an Independent Scientific Advisory Group for 
Emergencies, which drew on a wider range of disciplines 
and emphasised trans parency and public engagement.38 
The Scottish Government also formed its own scientific 
COVID-19 advisory group in late March, 2020, to advise 
on the release of lockdown measures.
In Germany, Singapore, South Korea, and Norway, 
experts on infectious diseases within established public 
health institutes are responsible for ensuring that scientific 
evidence drives policy making. The Korea Disease Control 
and Prevention Agency and the Norweigan Institute of 
Public Health, which have leading roles in each country’s 
response to COVID-19, operate under their ministries of 
health rather than independently from them, although the 
director of the Norwegian Institute has, on occasions, 
publicly disagreed with the government.39 Nonetheless, 
academics in these two countries have also started their 
own initiatives to offer recommendations to the govern-
ment. Germany’s national public health institute, the 
Robert Koch Institute, is nominally independent but 
owned and funded by the German Ministry of Health. The 
differing experiences have raised interesting questions 
about decision making in uncertainty. Can the quest for 
evidence of high quality, rather than application of the 
precautionary principle, delay important decisions?
Health-system capacity
An adequate health-system capacity is crucial to cope 
with possible surges in infections after lockdowns are 
lifted. This capacity includes having sufficient treatment 
facilities (eg, from hospitals equipped with intensive care 
units to step-down services in the community), medical 
equipment (eg, from ventilators for patients to personal 
protective equipment for staff), and health-care workers. 
A failure to invest in adequate capacity before a pandemic 
constrains the choices that can be made.
Germany’s experience shows the benefits of investing 
in the health system for the future. Before the COVID-19 
outbreak, the country already had 34 critical care beds 
per 100 000 inhabitants, compared with 9·7 in Spain 
and 5·2 in Japan (appendix p 18).40,41 Thus, Germany’s 
intensive care units were well under capacity even during 
the peak of the outbreak, unlike many other European 
counterparts that had to adapt other wards and spaces 
within hospitals to accommodate critically ill patients 
with COVID-19. With the exception of Germany, all 
countries also adopted triage systems (although some 
were unofficial) in which only patients with severe 
disease would be treated at designated hospitals, whereas 
patients with mild disease would be monitored at 
makeshift community facilities or at home. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and the UK repurposed large 
spaces, such as conference centres, to operate as 
community care facilities, although these facilities have 
been understaffed and underused in the UK compared 
with the other two countries.42 As the number of cases 
has decreased, many of these facilities are now kept on 
standby to be reopened if needed.
Many countries’ health-care systems have faced serious 
staffing problems during this pandemic, reflecting both 
an increase in demand and a decrease in staff, who were 
ill or self-isolating. In response, health-care workers were 
redeployed, volunteers were recruited, and non-emergency 
health-care services were scaled down or stopped. Once the 
peak of the outbreak has passed, it is important to resume 
routine services while retaining the ability to quickly 
repurpose resources if necessary during subsequent waves. 
Some hospitals in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, 
Norway, and the UK have started to offer tele consultations 
and remote monitoring to provide care for patients without 
unnecessary face-to-face visits.
In some countries, shortages of personal protective 
equipment have forced medical staff to work without 
adequate protection, and shortages of ventilators have 
forced staff to make difficult rationing decisions. In 
Spain, medical staff have made up more than 10% of total 
cases of COVID-19.43 By contrast, in Hong Kong, South 
Korea, and Singapore, sufficient stockpiling alongside 
structured training to ensure appropriate use of personal 
protective equipment and compliance with other safety 
procedures have largely protected health-care workers 
from infection.44,45 In all countries and regions, govern-
ments have increased efforts to procure necessary 
medicines and equipment, by sourcing from overseas 
and boosting the capacity of domestic companies.
Border control measures
As countries and regions gradually reopen their borders, 
the inflow of travellers should be managed to reduce 
the risk of people with COVID-19 travelling into the 
area. The five countries and regions in Asia Pacific 
have implemented strict border control measures, with 
Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore keeping their 
borders closed to most visitors. All arrivals entering these 
three countries or regions, and South Korea, are subject 
to mandatory COVID-19 testing and 14-day quarantine at 
home or at designated facilities. In Japan, all arrivals are 
also subject to a 14-day quarantine, and people from 
countries deemed to be a risk area are denied entry or 
required to undergo testing.
By contrast, European countries have been slow to 
require routine testing of travellers. As of June, 2020, 
Spain has exempted EU citizens from quarantine 
requirements, whereas Norway has exempted arrivals 
from specified Nordic regions with sufficiently low rates 
of transmission (ie, fewer than 20 confirmed cases per 
100 000 inhabitants and less than 5% positive tests on 
average per week during the past 2 weeks46) and has 
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extended this exemption to the Schengen area as of 
July 15, 2020. In Germany, people entering or returning 
to Germany from a country designated as a risk area are 
required to quarantine. The UK removed the requirement 
on all inbound travellers to self-isolate at home for 14 days 
for people coming from some countries but has since 
reimposed the requirement for travellers from many of 
the countries. The EU reopened internal borders at the 
end of June, 2020, and Spain has also fully opened its 
international borders to all countries from July 1, 2020. 
To prevent the potential rise in imported cases, Spain will 
incorporate automated processes, such as computerised 
health declarations and thermal-imaging cameras to 
facilitate temperature screening of visitors,47 which are 
already being used by many Asian countries and regions, 
including Hong Kong and Singapore.
Discussion
There is increasing realisation that removing COVID-19 
restrictions is not about returning to the prepandemic 
normal but about gradually and cautiously transitioning 
to a new normal, while being ready to reimpose measures 
if, and when, necessary. Nonetheless, countries have 
diverged in terms of the speed, scale, and intensity at 
which they have implemented similar interventions, and 
differences can be observed between Asia and Europe in 
this regard. For example, many Asian countries, except 
Japan, promptly did extensive testing, tracing, and 
isolating of all cases (ie, not just severe cases) from the 
start of the outbreak, strengthened by innovative surveil-
lance technology, whereas these processes have been 
considerably delayed in most of Europe, except Germany. 
Furthermore, confirmed cases are mostly isolated at 
institutions in Asia rather than at home, such as in 
Europe.28 Wearing of face coverings to protect others has 
also been adopted to a much greater extent in Asia than in 
Europe. These differences should be regarded against the 
background of experiences with past pan demics and 
economic policies adopted in the years leading up to this 
current crisis. In Europe, more than a decade of austerity 
measures have substantially weakened health systems 
and social protection in many countries. By contrast, 
major epidemics, such as SARS in 2003 and MERS 
in 2015, drove many Asian countries to invest in building 
robust health-care and public health infra structure that 
would be well equipped to handle the next outbreak. The 
public has also been better conditioned to cooperate with 
strict rules and invasive surveillance in times of crisis 
compared with the public in countries without experience 
of major epidemics, with most people accepting a trade-
off between their personal rights and the public good.20,48
Although the future of COVID-19 is unknown at 
present, countries should plan and prepare for the 
worst-case scenario. It is not too late for the following 
lessons to be learnt and applied now. First, as described 
here, countries can move forward mainly on the basis of 
the epidemiology or on the epidemiology in combination 
with other considerations; however, a clear and trans-
parent plan that describes which factors are being taken 
into account is essential. Ideally, these plans should 
explicitly state the levels or phases of easing restrictions, 
the criteria for moving to the next level or phase, and the 
containment measures that each level or phase entails.
Second, countries should not ease restrictions until they 
have robust systems in place to closely monitor the 
infection situation. Although much has been said about 
the use of R as a decision-making indicator, it requires data 
of high quality in real time (eg, use of R in Hong Kong) 
and it needs to be interpreted in the context of a good 
understanding of the epidemiology.14 For example, a small 
localised outbreak can increase the R value for the whole 
country, but it does not necessitate a nationwide lockdown.
Third, continued measures to reduce transmission will 
be needed for some time. For example, decreasing 
interactions to a few repeated contacts to create social 
bubbles, as pioneered by New Zealand, can allow inter-
action while reducing transmission.49 It is now accepted 
that cloth face coverings can significantly reduce person-
to-person transmission, with one German study reporting 
that the use of face coverings reduced the daily growth rate 
of reported COVID-19 infections by 40–60%.50 Crucially, 
governments should educate, engage, and empower all 
members of society, especially the most vulnerable, to 
participate in the pandemic response. Rather than crafting 
these measures on the basis of assumptions about what 
communities can or cannot accept, citizens should be 
directly involved in the process of coproducing tailored 
solutions appropriate for the local context.
Fourth, each country should have an effective find, test, 
trace, isolate, and support system in place. Preliminary 
data for testing suggests that identifying and isolating 
mild and asymptomatic cases can significantly reduce R, 
health-care burden, and overall fatality.51 The novel 
drive-through and walk-through screening models in 
South Korea that encourage proactive testing of potential 
case contacts offer a safe and efficient way to expand 
and enhance case finding.52 A modelling study has also 
suggested that institution-based isolation, as adopted by 
some Asian countries, is more effective than is home-
based isolation at reducing household and community 
transmission.28 On contact tracing, app-based tracing is 
estimated to stop trans mission if there is a 56% uptake 
rate in the population, and can be effective at slowing 
transmission at lower uptake rates.53 However, digital 
tracing cannot replace traditional manual tracing. As 
more evidence becomes available, some of these strat-
egies might be able to aid countries in maintaining viral 
suppression and avoiding return to a full lockdown.
Fundamentally, this find, test, trace, isolate, and support 
system needs to be supported by sustained investment 
in public health capacity and health-system capacity in 
terms of facilities, supplies, and workforce. WHO and the 
International Monetary Fund have jointly appealed for 
governments to prioritise health expen ditures, which 
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should go hand in hand with training and retaining 
skilled workers to fuel economic recovery.54 Finally, the 
argument is strong for countries adopting a so-called 
zero-COVID strategy, which aims to eliminate domestic 
transmission. The New Zealand experience shows that 
this strategy is challenging but is an important aspiration, 
not least as the growing burden of so-called long COVID 
becomes apparent in people who have survived COVID-19 
but continue to have symptoms for longer than expected.55 
As more countries start to reopen their borders, screening 
tools and quarantine measures become essential to 
identify potential cases and prevent further transmission 
in the community. To ensure that control measures are 
adequate, it is important for countries to review and 
optimise these processes regularly.
In the spirit of international collaboration, this Health 
Policy paper has presented lessons that can be learnt 
from nine countries and regions about the complex and 
challenging task of easing COVID-19 restrictions. As 
New Zealand’s experience shows, easing restrictions is 
something that should be managed with great care and 
continued vigilance, and, at the time of writing, Spain, 
Germany, and the UK have offered a reminder of the 
enormous potential for resurgence if comprehensive 
safeguards are not in place. Given the rapidly evolving 
nature of the pandemic and the measures taken in 
response to it, our Health Policy paper inevitably provides 
a provisional snapshot, rather than a conclusive ana lysis, 
of the situations and strategies of various countries 
and regions. Nonetheless, the comparative framework 
developed in this Health Policy paper can continue to be 
used to facilitate cross-country learning and guide future 
policy making. We hope that countries will continue to 
share their experiences, information, and strategies as 
they respond to this virus that knows no borders.
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